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This paper compares two similar samples of mining and steel corporations in 
pre-WW 1 Germany. One sample consists of corporations that were affiliated to 
one or more of the Grofibanken, the German “Great Banks", the other of 
companies that had to rely on other sources of finance. Statistical analysis 
conducted in the framework of a linear fixed effects model indicates that non 
Grofibanken affiliated companies were liquidity constrained. In addition to the 
empirical analysis the paper sets out the structure of German corporate control as 
it was laid down in the trade law reform of 1884, and gives a brief summary of 
the development of the mining and steel industry in Imperial Germany.
1 We would like to thank Brad De Long, Robert Waldmann, the European University 
Institute and Hermann and Christel Becht for financial and logistical support as well as Frau 
Wohrmann and the rest of the staff of the Library of the Industrie- und Handelskammer 
Frankfurt a.M. for their patience and for kindly giving us access to the statistical sources 
underlying this research. We are indebted to Monika Pohle for providing a historian's 
perspective on the subject and to the participants at Louis Phlips's EUI Research Workshop, 























































































































































































“The banks attend an industrial undertaking 
from its birth to its death, from promotion to 
liquidation, they stand by its side whilst it 
passes through the financial processes of 
economic life, whether usual or unusual, 
helping it and at the same time profiting from 
it."
[Jeidels (1905), page 50]
"Iron and steel rule the world."
[German proverb]
Introduction
Imperial Germany experienced an impressive takeoff in industrial growth from 
around 1880 to the decade before World War I. Its mining and steel industry, 
for example, overtook that of England by the 1880s and was only second in 
mining output to the United States on the eve of World War I. Authors like 
Gershenkron (1962), Tilly (1967, 1986), and Kocka (1978) have argued that 
this takeoff in production and output was helped tremendously by the 
institutional organisation of the German banking system. The so called "Great 
Banks", or Grofibanken, had a strong influence in the corporate governance of 
their clients and facilitated the channelling of funds for improvements and 
expansions. Other researchers, however, disagree with this contention. In 
particular, Neuberger and Hughs (1966) argue that the Great German Banks 
contributed little, if anything, to industrial growth.
In a world of perfect information and no agency costs, firms can borrow and 
invest optimally; liquidity has no effect on the investment decision. In a classic 
paper, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958), showed under what 
conditions financial structure becomes irrelevant for real investment decisions. 
Jorgenson (1971) has provided an extensive survey of the theory of investment 
behaviour, distinguishing between classical, neoclassical, accelerator and Q 
models, - models of investment demand. Assuming perfectly elastic supply, 
Modigliani-Miller (M-M) applies to all of them. More recently, the classical 




























































































supply and rationing. These, can be motivated in many ways2, but they all 
predict that liquidity matters.
Early empirical studies ignored the effect of financial factors on the investment 
decision and concentrated on testing rival theories in a representative agent, 
Modigliani-Miller framework3. In subsequent work, many authors moved away 
from this restrictive framework, taking into account the heterogeneity of firms 
and financial structures. A particularly clear summary and an excellent example 
of this approach has been provided by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). 
This paper follows their approach4 and investigates the assertion that the 
Grofibanken, the German “Great Banks” played a role in the financing of 
German industry that was not dissimilar to that of the House of Morgan in the 
United States [De Long (1991), Ramirez (1992)] and the post-WW2 keiretsu 
and pre-WW2 zaibatsu in Japan [Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein (1990), Hoshi, 
Kashyap, Scharfstein (1991)]. It uses a priori information to divide a sample 
into a M-M group and a liquidity constrained group. Concentrating on the 
mining and steel industry, one of the most important industries in size and, in 
international comparison, one of the pre-WWl German successes in growth, 
the paper hopes to add another piece of evidence to a recent new view of the 
quantitative history of comparative financial capitalism and empirical work that 
does not use the Modigliani - Miller theorem everywhere.
Section I gives an outline of what was special about the "Great Banks", their 
business strategy and their development. Section II briefly reviews the main 
components of German corporate structure, as set out in the reform to the 
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), the German trade law, of 1884. This is important 
because corporate control takes a somewhat different form from the United 
States or Japan and played an important part in the evolving relationship 
between the “Great Banks” and industry. Also, the HGB set out minimum 
reporting standards that had to be respected by all corporations and provide the 
basis for the balance sheet data underlying the analysis. Section IH investigates 
the nature of the relationship between the “Great Banks” and industry. It argues
2 Two examples are credit rationing [Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)] 
and agency costs [Jensen (1986)].
3 Much of this literature is summarised in Jorgenson (1971).
4 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) use a consumption inspired "rich and poor" criterion 
to sort firms, a priori, into a liquidity constrained and an unconstrained group. This is the 
main weakness of their paper; see the discussion by Alan Blinder and Christopher Sims in 




























































































that the decisive link was through members of the Grofibankens' management 
or board of governors who were placed on the board of industrial customers. 
We call this a board of governors or Aufsichtsrat link. Section IV takes a closer 
look at the industry under study, mining and steel, as well as describing the 
companies used in the analysis. Section V uses the Aufsichtsrat link and tries to 
derive a quantitative measure for determining the affiliation of industrial 
enterprises to one of the banking groups. It also discusses the transformation of 
the original German income statements into broader categories with English 
labels and the subsequent transformation of the broader accounting categories 
with English labels into the appropriate free cash flow and investment 
measures. Section VI presents the econometric model and results. Section VII 
discusses the results and Section VUI concludes. Two appendices discuss the 
construction of the regressors from the original balance sheet data and the 
effect of an important outlier, the Oberschlesische Kokswerke und Chetnische 
Fabriken, (Oberschlesische Kokswerke) on the regression results.
I. The Great German Banks
In Germany, banking influence started through the financing and reorganisation 
of railroads, which were a big business after 1850. Tilly (1986) points out that 
private bankers were represented in the railroad management committees as 
early as 1830s.
"Bankers not only underwrote the issue o f railroad securities but also managed 
the companies' current accounts; and to insure their investments they occupied 
key positions in the management..."
[Tilly, (1986), p. 119]
Although railroad financing provided a stepping stone for the development of 
finance capitalism in Germany, it wasn't until the rise of big business and 
organised capitalism in the 1870s that firmly established the role of the 
Grofibanken in the financing and management of industrial corporations. 
Kocka (1978) characterises this period of German growth as one in which
"[t]he main trends included the growth o f large scale business through 
internal expansion and mergers; the increasing separation o f ownership and 
control; the diversification o f large concerns through internal expansion or by 






























































































The liberal laws of 1870 allowed flexible rules regarding the issue of new 
securities, in particular share capital. The establishment of joint-stock 
companies was an important way in which the banks could influence their 
client enterprises. The panic of 1873 only reinforced this trend of banking 
influence over corporations because, after the panic and the subsequent 
economic downturn investors became more cautious about securities and banks 
served as guardians of their corporate clients' share capital.5 The period of 
liberalism quickly disappeared and was replaced by one with more restraint. 
The Corporate Law of 1884 marked a significant change in the evolution of the 
German corporation and, Tilly (1986) maintains, increased the Grofibanken 
influence over the industrial corporation. By raising the minimum size of 
shares that corporations must issue, the law forced companies to search for 
powerful banks that could float a security issue. In addition, it increased the 
time lag between the establishment of the company and its first listing in the 
stock exchange in order to weed out weak companies before they were actually 
listed. Furthermore, the law strengthened the influence of the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) over the management of the corporation. Since bank executives 
were members of this board this automatically meant that the banks had a 
greater influence over the company's internal decisions.
II. Corporate Control in Imperial Germany
The German corporation, as defined in the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) of 1884 
had three main agents: Executive or management (Vorstand), a Board of 
Supervisors (Aufsichtsrat) and the General Meeting of Shareholders (Aktionare, 
Generalversammlung). The relationship between these three actors was 
regulated by writing separate sections6 7, stipulating respective privileges and 
duties, for each of the three groups. From the HGB, these are summarised in 
Table F.
5See Tilly (1986).
6 Actually, there are only two sections. The supervirory board was supposed to act on behalf 
of the shareholders , so they share one section of the law.
7 For a short, accurate and effective summary of the main institutional features of the 
German corporation and the relationship between industry and the Grofibanken, see Whale 
(1930), Chapter n . Whale was writing for a British audience and was aquainted with several 
German banking personalities, including Otto Jeidels. A recent and very informative 
collection of sources that trace the political and legal discussions that lead to the reform of 




























































































Table I.A: The Agents of Corporate Control in Imperial Germany
(entries are very free summaries o f the original legal text, not translations)






in cases where shareholders ask for an independent investigation 
the Aufsichtsrat (AR) has the right to be heard by the appointing 
court
222a 2
the AR  is appointed by the annual general meeting (AGM) of the 
shareholders by a majority vote
224
(191) (1)
the AR must be reappointed at least every five years 224
(191) (3)




the AR supervises the Vorstand in all administrative matters and 
with the aim of keeping itself informed about all affairs of the 
company
225 1
the AR can request the Vorstand to provide copies or access to the 
companies' books and other papers.
225 1
the AR has to call an AGM "if the best interest of the company 
requires it"
225 2
other duties of the AR can be laid down in the company's 
constitution
225 3
the members of the AR can not transfer their duties to other persons 225 4
members of the AR may not be directors or employees of the 
company
225a 1
when a director leaves the management of the corporation, the 
AGM must relieve him from his duties before he can be elected as a 
member of the AR
225a 2





























































































Table I.B: The Agents of Corporate Control in Imperial Germany
(entries are very free summaries o f the original legal text, not translations)




(directors) the directors represent the corporation in all business and legal 
matters.
227 1
the board of directors can consist of one or more persons, be 
shareholder(s) or not
227 2
directors can be fired at any time, but may have the right to be 
adequately compensated.
227 3
the directors are obliged to observe the limitations imposed upon 
their business operations by the corporation's constitution and the 
resolutions of the AGM
231 1
directors may not, without special permission, run a private 
business.
232
the board of directors, unless otherwise stipulated in the 
corporation's constitution, calls the AGM
236 1
an AGM must be called "if the interests of the company require it" 236 2
the board of directors must ensure that written records of company 
accounts are kept
239 1
the directors must publish, at the most six months into the new 
business year, a balance sheet, a profit and loss account as well as a 
report on the development and conditions of the corporation; these 
documents, together with the remarks of the AR, must be presented 
to the AGM.
239 2
when losses are larger than half of the par value, the directors must 
call an AGM
240 1
the directors must declare bankruptcy when the company can no 
longer make regular payment or the value of total debt, in any one 
year, is larger than the value of total assets.
240 2
in cases where shareholders ask for an independent investigation 
the Vorstand has the right to be heard by the appointing court
222a 2
has to give access to all documents required by independent 





























































































Table I.C: The Agents of Corporate Control in Imperial Germany
(entries are very free summaries o f the original legal text, not translations)






owns a share of the assets of a corporation corresponding to 
shareholding.
216 l
can not ask the company to refund the par value of the shares as 
long as the company operates
216 2
merely has a claim on profits and only if explicitly stated in the 
Gesellschaftsvertrag
216 2
may not be charged or paid interest 217 1
may exercise rights, particularly those relating to conduct of 
business, the balance sheet and the distribution of profits, by voting 
at the annual general assembly
221 1
shareholder who hold together shares that represent more than 10% 
of par value and held those shares for more than six months can ask 
the responsible court (at the place of incorporation) to appoint 
independent accountants to look into any dealings of the company 
that are no older than two years
222a 1
a minority representing 20% of total par value can call a general 
assembly or place particular items on the agenda of the AGM; if the 
directors or the AR do not respond to these measures, the minority 
shareholders can appeal to the legal authorities at the place of 
incorporation for permission to act themselves; the corporation's 
constitution can set a percentage lower than 20%.
237




























































































A vital aspect of the law, not included in the table, were the penal articles in 
Section IV. They have one common theme, — the truth. Directors and 
supervisory board members who sought to mislead the shareholders, in their 
speeches at the AGM, through publications or, indeed, through false numbers 
in the balance sheets, could, at best, get a fine, worse, go to prison and, in the 
extreme, loose their civic rights (HGB, articles 249, 249a-d).
Many details are not directly regulated by the law that provides for them to be 
set out in the corporation’s constitution (Gesellschaftsvertrag)8. Some 
contemporary commentators argued that it was important what was not 
regulated by the HGB (Jeidels (1905), page 145). For example, a member of 
the AR  need not own shares in the company and, since there are no legal 
restrictions, the same person can sit on the supervisory boards of many 
companies.
The legislators intended the shareholders, through the annual general meeting, 
to be the most powerful institution inside the corporation. As the ultimate 
owners of the corporation, shareholders were thought to deserve ultimate 
control. The institution of the Aufsichtsrat was intended to look after 
shareholders' interests and provide professional supervision of management on 
behalf of the shareholders. In practice, the law of 1884 gave the Aufsichtsrat 
more de facto power than the legislators must have intended. In Staub's 
authoritative commentary of the HGB, it is argued that the Aufsichtsrat, 
provided it could find the necessary 3/4 majority in the AGM, could alter the 
corporation's constitution in such a way that "in this way the directors could be, 
as far as their internal position is concerned, more or less, not altogether, 
reduced to the executive arm of the Aufsichtsrat." (Konig et. al., 1906, p. 838). 
The position of the Aufsichtsrat was further strengthened by the apparent lack 
of attendance by the smaller shareholders. Saling's Borsenpapiere (1909, p. 
102) comment that "all shareholders are strongly recommended to attend the 
annual general meeting in person. Shareholders should obviously have good 
knowledge of the law and the corporation's constitution; unfortunately this is
8 For example, the Gesellschaftsvertrag might stipulate general guidelines for the disribution 
of profits. To be specific, in 1905 Bayer & Co. the well known chemical company and today 
No. 51 of the Forbes Foreign 500, distributed profits as follows: At least 5% of profits to 
reserve fund, from the remainder extraordinary deprciation, reserves and retained earnings, 
4% of the former dividends, the remainder is dividend minus 6% of the remainder for the 
Aufsichsrat , (Saling’s (1906/07), page 1115). The constitution could be altered by the 
annual general meeting by a three quarter majority. These provisions became important 




























































































not always the case. Furthermore, the very low attendance of most annual 
general meetings bears witness on the indolence of many shareholders who put 
their faith into the hands of a very few, who not always have the best interest of 
all shareholders in mind."
III. The Relationship between the "Great Banks" and Industry
The focus of this paper is on contrasting the financing of Grofibanken  
affiliated industrial enterprises with those who, for one reason or another, did 
not form part of the nexus. In similar studies on the House of Morgan, De Long 
(1991) and Ramirez (1992) could rely on the reports of the Pujo Committee 
(1913a, 1913b), which had compiled a list of Morgan affiliated companies in 
1910-11 (compare De Long (1991), Table 6.3). For Japan, Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1990, 1991) rely on the classification provided by Nakatani 
(1984). More recent authors, for example Garcia and Yafeh (1992), use the 
sophisticated point scales of Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1984). To 
determine what is the appropriate procedure for Imperial Germany, a 
discussion of the general nature of the business relationship between banks and 
industry, as it is suggested by contemporary sources like Jeidels (1905) and 
Riesser (1907), might be in order.
There are mainly three ways in which a bank and an industrial corporation can 
interact. First, a company might conduct its daily business through a current 
account it holds with one or more banks. This is known as Kontokorrentkredit 
and was common practice in Imperial Germany. Second, banks served as an 
important link to external financial markets. For untraded corporations, banks 
typically helped to float the company on the stock exchange. In the case of an 
traded corporations, banks underwrote the issuance of new equity or long term 
debt. The third, and most important interaction mechanism is the appointment 
of a bank officer to the supervisory board of a client corporation, with or 
without taking a direct stake in the company.
The Grofibanken offered all of the above mentioned services and often 
undertook to monopolise their business relationship with any one company9. 
Lending, emissions, direct investment and supervisory board members Relped 
the bank to monitor and, in many cases influence decision making in the 
industrial enterprise. Nevertheless, Jeidels (1905) carefully distinguishes




























































































between monitoring, in the sense of information gathering, and direct influence 
on a corporation's business decisions. The current account business was 
important for monitoring in the sense of information gathering, but it provided 
little or no direct influence over the decisions of management [Jeidels 
(1905)]10 *. Given the legal framework provided by the HGB, the most powerful 
levers a bank could apply were the annual general meeting and the Aufsichtsrat.
There were many ways of influencing the annual general meeting. First, the 
bank could take a direct stake in corporations. Jeidels (1905) research of annual 
reports revealed that only two banks, the Darmstadter Bank before 1900 and 
the A. Schaafhausener Bankverein in and after 1900, published the names of 
the companies in which they had, even though these reports did not publish the 
size of these stakes. From the evidence Jeidels was able to gather, he concludes 
that long term direct investments were uncommon.
"On the whole [we must conclude that] direct stakes in industrial enterprises 
were not a common common form o f relationship between a Grofibank and 
industry. Direct stakes are an addition to other [more powerful ways], a means 
to an end."
[Jeidels (1905), page 121]".
Obtaining a temporary majority in the annual general meeting was not difficult 
for the Grofibanken\ - because of the low attendance by small shareholders, say 
50% of par value, and through voting shares that were entrusted to the banks by
10 In some cases, the banks could use debt to influence the decisions of management. Jeidels 
(1905) himself quotes a letter from Dresdner Bank addressed to the management of the 
Nordwestmitteldeutsche Zementsyndikat: "According to your announcement published in 
the 'Reichsanzeiger' we see the possibility that the annual general meeting taking place at the 
end of this month, might pass resolutions that might be conducive to introducing changes in 
your business that are not in our interest. For this reason, and to our regret, we have to 
announce that we must cancel the agreed credit facility and we have to ask you to pay back 
the money you have already received until the end of this month. However, if the 
aforementioned annual general assembly takes the decisions we favour, and passes 
resolutions that guarantee that these decisions will be upheld in the future, we shall be happy 
to negotiate a new credit." [Jeidels (1905), page 126].
1'However, he provides several examples where one or more of the Great Banks bought a 
temporary majority in a corporation they sought to dominate, particularly to place their own 
directors on the Aufsichtsrat. Jeidels mentions the example of the Phonix AG, a large 
mining and steel coporation, that had to decide whether to join the German steel cartel or 
not. The Schaafhausener Bankverein thought the Phdnix should join, bought a majority stake 
before the annual general meeting and the Phonix joined. According to Jeidels (1905, page 
111), the bank did not keep the shares. In 1901, the Dresdner Bank acted similarly when it 





























































































stock market investors (Depotstimmrecht) own possession of 10% of par value 
and 16% of par value through the Depotstimmrecht could already bring a 
m ajority12. Jeidels arguments make sense; direct investment in industrial 
enterprises involves risk which the banks avoided13. To secure their loans and 
influence corporations they could use the direct investments of industrial 
groups that were very close to them. In this way they could exert power but did 
not have to assume the additional risk.
Placing bank directors or members of the bank's Aufsichtsrat onto the boards of 
corporations was common practice and the most effective route of influencing 
managerial decisions of affiliated corporations. Agreement on this point ranges 
from socialists like Rudolf Hilferding (1910)14 to Staub's commentary of the 
HGB and academically inclined bankers like Riesser and Jeidels.
"Daily business, equity issues and the presence o f bankers on the Aufsichtsrat 
can be viewed as three spheres with different diameters and importance: In the 
widest circle there are those companies that have a current account with the 
bank, with or without a credit facility. The next closer circle is formed by those 
companies whose first or new equity was issues by the bank. The third and 
closest contains those where the bank has a say in the Aufsichtsrat."
[Jeidels, (1905), page 109]
Unless a firm did current account business with one and only one of the "Great 
Banks", the current account alone would not provide the bank with the 
opportunity to look behind the facades of a firm that might have been
12 Buying voting rights was not a (legal) option. Article 249e HGB threatens shareholders 
"who has been given or promised special favours in return for voting in a particular way will 
be fined ten to 30 Marks but no less than 1000 Marks." Article 249f HGB too is very 
explicit: "Those who vote shares owned by others without their approval will be fined ten to 
thirty Marks, but no less than one thousand Mark. The same applies to those who borrowed 
shares from another and those who lent them." Having people sign over voting rights 
without receiving cash payments (but maybe the right to deposit ones shares in a banks' 
vaults for free) was not illegal.
13 Indeed, this is another argument put forward by Jeidels himself. He gives examples of 
Creditbanks that had large stakes in industrial enterprises and were severely damaged by the 
chain of bancrupcies in 1873. In particular, he cites the Essener Kreditanstalt that had a 
policy of direct investment in industry. After a severe setback in 1873 and many subsequent 
problems, the management declared in 1897 that "we have come to the conclusion that we 
should refrain from all foundation or share speculation and concentrate on the current 
account and comission based equity business." [Jeidels (1905), page 101].
14 Tom Bottomore, who wrote the introduction to the English translation of Hilferding's 
book, cites one of Hilferding's contemporaries, the editor of the Vienna socialist magazine 




























































































constructed like one of Potemkins' villages. Having a banker on the 
Aufsichtsrat would provide the bank with knowledge about all of the firms' 
decision making process and all internal affairs. This serves as our a priori 
motivation for the existence of a tighter liquidity constraint among firms not 
affiliated to one of the Grofianken. In section VI we discuss in more detail our 
quantitative measure of Grofibanken affiliation.
IV. Mining and Steel
The industrial classification considered here is “Berg- und Hiittenwerke”, 
mining and smelting works. In the principal data source, S a lin g ’s 
Borsenpapiere, this includes coal mining of all kinds, iron ore mining, pig-iron, 
raw iron and steel production as well as salt and gypsum mining. While the 
former can be considered a well integrated industry, the last two are really quite 
separate and were excluded from the present analysis. From scanning the 
available company information, the industry comprised specialised 
corporations as well a "mixed" establishments. The industry also featured 
several powerful cartels that, notably in the case of the mining and steel cartels, 
caused severe conflicts of interest to both the banks and the mixed 
corporations.
Imperial Germany had three major mining districts, distinct in industrial 
organisation, ownership structure and “industrial culture”. The traditional 
mining regions were, the Ruhr valley (Ruhrgebiet) and Upper Silesia 
(Oberschlesien); rapidly expanding newcomers were Lorraine (Elsass- 
Lothringen) and the Saar (Saargebiet). Upper Silesia mainly featured state 
owned businesses or mining, smelting and processing plants that were founded 
by local gentry. As early as the 1770s, Frederick the Great had realised the 
military importance of silesian iron and coal and in 1779 he put the Graf von 
Reden in charge of the whole district15. Hence, the main initiative for 
development of the area came from the Prussian government. Eventually the 
large landowners caught on and started to develop their own mining and 
smelting activities. The Oberschlesische Eisenbahnbedarfs A.G., the 
Vereinigte Konigs,- und Laurahiitte, the Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie A.G.
15 Pounds and Parker (1957) argue that Frederick's "purpose was to cast guns for the use of 
the Prussian army, and the closer to the Austrian border they were made, the shorter would 





























































































and the Kattowitzer A.G. were all started by powerful landowners. Towards 
1913, Upper Silesia produced coal, iron-ore, pig-iron, steel, finished and semi­
finished products, often in large, vertically integrated operations.
The Ruhr was very different from Upper Silesia. It had high quality coal 
deposits, but no iron-ore, it was in a densely populated area and it was close to 
an established mining and iron and steel industry in the Siegerland16. Also, it 
had a long time tradition of bourgeois entrepreneur capitalism and financing 
from private banking houses like Deichmann and Oppenheim. It is no 
coincidence that Cologne (with Darmstadt) is considered the birthplace of the 
German Creditbanks. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the A. 
Schaafhausener Bankverein, founded 1848, was the financing of the local 
mining and steel industry [Donaubauer, (1988), Pohl (1982)].
After the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the Treaty of Frankfurt, the 
Lorraine, Alsace and the Saar were annexed by Prussia and thereby became 
part of the newly formed Imperial Germany17. The Lorraine featured very large 
iron-ore deposits, the so called minette, the Saar had rich coalfields. Both 
regions featured and developed a powerful smelting and pig-iron industry18. 
Benham (1934), gives the following breakdown of pig-iron and steel output 
between the different regions:
16 Many of the Ruhr's most successful industrialists came from the traditional mining 
regions: Hoesch, Thyssen and Poensgen from the Eifel-Aachen, Piepenstock, Harkort and 
Romheld from the Sieg-Lahn-Dill area. [Pounds and Parker (1957)].
17 Some historians argue that the 1871 borders were drawn to make the iron-ore deposits of 
the minette fall to Germany; others argue that too little was known about the importance of 
these deposits at the time and the shape of the border line can be explained in strategic terms 
alone.
18 The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg formed part of the German customs union and was 
dominated by German corporations. Hence it is often included in mining and steel statistics 




























































































Table 2: German Iron and Steel Output 1913 by Region
_____________ (in thousands of tons)__________________
Piq Iron Steel
Germany (1922 frontiers) 10.904 12,182




Source: Benham (1934), p. 18
In international comparison, the German mining and steel industry was very 
successful. In 1870, England's real output in pig-iron was 4.3 times larger than 
that of Germany, it produced nearly twice as much steel, 3.8 times as much 
iron-ore and 3.3 times as much coal. Indeed, England was also ahead of the 
United States, producing 3.6 times as much pig-iron, four times as much steel 
and mining 3.7 times as much coal and five times as much iron-ore. Taking 
Britain as the benchmark, the subsequent pre-WW 1 growth of German steel, 
pig-iron and iron-ore output was impressive, the growth of US for all four 
commodities formidable. By 1913, Germany had become the second largest 
producer of steel, pig-iron and iron-ore. England was still ahead, although only 
marginally, in coal mining.
Figure l.A: Pig-Iron Output in tons (10®)
O Germany V  France O England





























































































Figure l.B: Steel Output in tons (10®)
O Germany 7  France O England
A  United States
Year
Figure l.C : Iron Ore Output in tons (10®)
O Germany V  France O England





























































































Figure l.D : Coal O utpu t in tons (IO**)
O Germany V  France O England
A  United States
Year




The principal source of the balance sheet data underlying the statistical analysis 
comes from Saling's Borsenjahrbucher, a digest of annual reports and related 
information that comprised all publicly traded German corporations and was 
intended as "a handbook for bankers, lawyers and other capitalists", and famed 
for its accuracy. The sample period considered is 1906 to 1912, a period that 
featured a downturn in the business cycle and, it was hoped, a variance 
inducing credit crunch. Figure 5 shows percentage growth rates for the Imperial 
economy from unification to WW1. The sample period shows a small increase 
in the growth rate from 1906 to 1907 and a decrease from 1907 to 1909. 
Compared to previous swings, for example the 1901 recession, the fluctuations 
appear mild but turned out to be sufficient.
Saling's Borsenjahrbucher report a total of 92 mining corporations that were 
traded on the German Stock Exchanges between 1906 and 1912. Hence, they 




























































































sample of 92, we selected 29 and since they all have total assets in excess of 1 
million Marks must be considered large, even for corporations19.










1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915
Year
Source: Hoffmann (1965), Table 224, pp. 785
The analysis crucially hinges on the classification into affiliated and non- 
affiliated companies. This was performed by using an Aufsichtsrat criterion. 
One of the requirements of the HGB was that the names of a corporation's 
directors and Aufsichtsrdte should be made public, and Saling's diligently 
reports them, together with the title and the affiliation of each member. 
Scanning the list of names for each corporation in the sample, we looked for 
Aufsichtsrdte who either featured the title "Bankier" or were directly associated 
with the name of one of the six Grofibanken. While the latter gave a clear 
affiliation criterion, the former did not always list the bank the "Bankier" was 
associated with. To resolve this issue, we used a second publication, the 
Adressbuch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsrdte that provides a mapping from 
names to banks and corporations. For the final sample of 29, the resulting 
Aufsichtsrat affiliations are listed below.
19In practice, we scanned the 92 companies in Saling's, comparing total assets and indicators 
for Grofibanken affiliation. From the companies that appeared affiliated we selected the 
smallest in terms of total assets. We then tried to match these with non-affiliated companies 
of roughly the same size. Short of collecting data on all 92 companies (for the larger sample 
of all coporations - available from the Handbuch der Aktiengesellschaften - one can not test 
the Q model), we felt this was the best we could do in 5 x 5 working days and a 9.00-16.30 




























































































Unfortunately, the procedure set out above is not sufficiently accurate; some 
Grofibanken emissaries were not bankers but came from industry, especially if 
they came from the Aufsichtsrat of a Grofibank. It appears that a directorship 
was more like a title for Saling's and industry directors who sat on the 
Aufsichtsrat of a Grofibank and the Aufsichtsrat of one of the mining and steel 
corporations do not appear with the title "Bankier" and were not identified as 
Grofibanken affiliated20. To get around this problem, this paper draws on 
related work by Becht and De Long (1993), where the same classification 
problem appeared for a sample of 632 corporations, rendering the "manual" 
method applied here impossible.
Fortunately, Saling's features three main indices; one matching a corporation's 
name to the respective Saling's volume page number, two, matching the place 
of incorporation to a Saling's page number and, three, matching a Director's or 
Aufsichtsrat's name to a page number. Taking any one volume of Saling's, this 
allows the (almost) exact matching of a list with the names and page numbers 
of all Grofibanken directors and Aufsichtsrdte to a list of all corporations and 
page numbers21. This was done for the year 1914 and the resulting (few) extra 
cases were added to Table 2. A complete list with all Aufsichtsrat members and 
Grofibanken directors who sat on the boards of mining corporations can be 
found in Becht and De Long (1993). *2
20In the case of Grofibank directors, the bank's name appears in parentheses after person's 
name; in the case of industrialists the name of the industrial corporation appears instead.
2'The list with names is matched to the list of corporations, dropping multiple name 
matches. The resulting file has the same number of records as the corporation file. The 
director page number appears in one column, the corporation page number in another. If the 
match proceeds smoothly, the corporation page number column is identical to the page 
column in the corporation file. The director page column consists of page numbers and 
missing values. A simple condition that transforms missing values into a non-affiliation code 
(a zero) and page numbers into an affiliation code (if record > 0 write 1) will yield the 
desired classification. All said, there is a caveat; Saling's reports the page number a directors 
name is printed on and also reports the page a corporation's name is printed on. Although the 
director list appears first thing after the name, it can go onto the next page. Also, some small 





























































































Table 2: Banker Presence on Board of Sample Companies
Company Bank Affiliation 1 2 3 4
Anhaltsche Kohlenwerke Gebr. Arons 1 0 0 0
Annener Gusstahlwerk Nationalbank für Deutschland 1 1 0 0
Arenberg'sche AG für Bergbau None 0 0 0 0
Bismark hutte Nationalbank für Deutschland 1 1 0 0
Buderus'sche Eisenwerke Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank 1 0 0 0
Concordia Berqbau Deutsch. Effekt. u. Wechsel Bank 1 0 0 0
Bergwerks AG Consolidation None 0 0 0 0
Deutsch Ôstereichische 
Berowerks AG
Dresdner Bank 1 1 1 1
Donnersmarckhiitte Deutsche Bank 1 1 1 1
Duxer Kohlenverein None 0 0 0 0
Eintracht Braunkohlenwerke Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank 1 0 0 0
Eisenwerk Kraft, AG A. Schaaffhaus. Bankverein 1 1 1 1
Eschweiler Bergwerksverein None 0 0 0 0
Essener Bergwerks-Verein Kônig 
Wilhelm
None 0 0 0 0
Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke 
A-G
Arons & Walter 1 0 0 0
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A-G Disconto Gesellschaft 1 1 1 1
Grube Leopold Eddewitz A-G Nationalbank für Deutschland 1 1 1 1
Georgs Marien Bergwerk u. 
HQttenverein
Osnabrticker Bank 1 1 1 0
Gusstahlwerk Witten Oppenheim 1 0 0 0
Hagener Gusstahlwerke Bergisch Mërkische Bank Hagen 1 1 1 0
Harkort'sch Bergwerke, Gotha Gebr. Richter 1 0 0 0
Hasper Eisen u. Stahlwerke None 0 0 0 0
Kônig Marienhütte A-G None 0 0 0 0
Kôlner Bergwerks Verein, 
Altenessen
None 0 0 0 0
Kôniqsbom A.G. f iir  Bergbau None 0 0 0 0
Mühlheimer Bergwerks-Verein Dresdner Bank 1 1 1 1
Oberschlesische Eisenbahn- 
Bedarfs AG
Deutsche Bank 1 1 1 1
Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie Schlesinger-Trier & Co., 
Nationalbank für Deutschland
1 1 0 0
Oberschlesische Kokswerke und 
Chemische Fabriken
Schlesischer Bankverein 1 1 1 0
Source: Saling's Borsenpapiere (1908), Adressbuch der Direktoren und 
Aufsichtsrdte (1908)
There are several problems with the proposed classification. One, some of the 




























































































classification was done for one year, a cross-section, but is used for grouping a 
panel; some units of observations might have changed affiliation status over 
time22. Third, many would argue that the Aufsichtsrat criterion might not be a 
precise measure of affiliation. Although an Aufsichtsrat position provided 
complete information for the bank (compare article 225 HGB), other forms of 
monitoring might have been sufficient for lifting a liquidity constraint from a 
corporation. With reference to the opening quote from Jeidels, Whale (1930) 
argues that "the connection [between banks and firms] has its beginning as a 
rule not in an act of promotion, but in a current account relation. As this 
develops the bond will probably be tightened by Aufsichtsrat representation, 
and, as occasionally arises, capital transactions - conversion into a company, 
raising of fresh capital, issues of bonds, reconstructions, etc. - will be 
undertaken by the bank on behalf of its customer. At this stage still, however, 
the current account relation retains its primary importance. In the first place, as 
a continuous relation and one which gives the bank an insight into most of the 
customer's money transactions, it provides much of the data required for 
estimating the risk involved in the intermittent capital transactions. This, at any 
rate, is the case if each customer deals exclusively with one bank, as is insisted 
upon by the banks so far as is within their power." [Whale (1930), page 52].
We believe, however, that the Aufsichtsrat criterion is sufficiently reliable to 
measure bank monitoring and the relative ease for obtaining funds in external 
capital markets. After all, we are not claiming the Aufsichtsrat criterion per se 
adds liquidity or value, but that it is correlated with the probably unmeasurable 
and unobservable characteristics that would constitute the true measure of 
affiliation. Moreover, in the absence of data on current account (Kontokorrent) 
business, the Aufsichtsrat criterion is the only reliable and quantifiable measure 
available.
Nevertheless, to feel more confident about these issues we perform sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the classification criterion. The first classification
22For example, let zero represent non-affiliated and 1 affiliated. Our methodology rules out 
important sequences like (0,0,0,0,1,1,1). A switch from zero to one can occur for two 
reasons; one, a Grofbank places an Aufsichtsrat on an industrial corporations board directly, 
two, the Grofibank buys a smaller bank who has an Aufsichtsrat on the corporation's board. 
Both cases are important and, if our reasoning is correct, should provide evidence for the 
removal of a liquidity constraint. Although we do not have statistical evidence for this, the 
19th century sources suggest that (1,1,1,1,1,1,1) and (0,0,0,0,0,0,0) were indeed the typical 
runs, especially for relatively more mature corporations. Hence, our cross-section criterion 




























































































(column 1, Table 2) considers all corporations that had any banker or bank 
emissaries, private or corporate, on their supervisory board as affiliated. The 
second classification (column 2) is more restrictive and excludes the private 
bankers. The third classification excludes the Nationalbank fur Deutschland, 
since it was not considered a Grofibank.22. The fourth is the narrowest 
definition and excludes all Aufsichtsrat members that were not sent directly 
from one of the six "Great Banks", including those sent by minor banks in one 
of the Grofibanken banking groups. We feel most confident in the first and the 
last classification; we do not really know how far the power of the Grofibanken 
extended into the rest of the banking world and what effect the presence of a 
Grofibanken friendly private banker on a mining corporations board would 
have.
A second, and almost equally important issue is the quality and type of balance 
sheet data found in Saling's. In Appendix I we transcribe a representative 
balance sheet with an English translation of its items. Note that it is much 
more detailed than, for example, an American balance sheet23 4. On the assets 
side (compare Table 1.1 in Appendix I.), the balance sheet includes separate 
accounts for plant and equipment , cash and liquid securities (such as bank 
accounts, bonds, and paper assets), accounts receivable, and inventories. The 
liabilities side of this company includes the par value of common equity stock 
and of preferred stock. The mining company in this example did not issue any 
long term debt, and so the rest of the items are mostly reserves, retained 
earnings, and other items. In the example, the Consolidierte Alkali-Werke 
(compare Table 1.1. in Appendix I) reported a total net earnings available for 
distribution (NEAD) of M l.97 million, of which 73% will be paid out as 
dividends (M. 1.44 mill), 14% will go to pay the management and the 
Aufsichtsrat, and the rest (13%) will go into the different reserve accounts. 
Once dividends and management are paid, the appropriate categories in the 
liabilities side go on the credit side; Cash and Bank Deposits go on the debit 
side.
23However, the Nationalbank fur Deutschland, at least as far as the mining and steel industry 
is concerned, used the same kind of business strategy as the Grofibanken.
24Alexander and Archer's European Accounting Guide describes today's items in the German 
companies financial statement. Since today's reporting standards are based on a law that is 





























































































For each of the selected companies we aggregated the original balance sheet 
items into broader categories. This has the advantage of making the different 
companies comparable, it allows us to focus on the financial aspects of the 
balance sheet and, through aggregation, minimises the number of missing 
values. A sample of our "stencil balance sheet" and the exact mapping from the 
originals to this aggregated version are provided in Appendix I.
VI. The Econometric Model and Results
The Investment Equation Specification
We fit investment equations for the Q-Model with possible liquidity effects. 
The equations are set up in the framework of the least squares dummy variable 
model (or linear fixed effects model25) imposing homogeneity restrictions 
across time on the intercepts and slopes and across firms for the slopes within 
the affiliated and non affiliated groups. We do not impose homogeneity on the 
intercepts across firms, thus allowing for a degree of firm heterogeneity. 
Following Floshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990,91) we also use year 
dummies to control for macro-economic shocks26. In total, we ran eight 
regression, dividing the sample into Grofibanken affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms four times, -- corresponding to the four different affiliation criteria set out 
in the previous section.
The selected regression specification takes the following form :
I T —  - “ o + a ,
A i,r-1 A i,r-1
► “ 3 -5 0 -  *  y ,  *3100 ' “ i -  1,2, ..29 
(-1 ,2 ,.. 7
where:
25Compare Judge el. al. (1985) page 518, Hsiao (1986) page 29 or Greene (1990) page 482, 
amongst others, for a textbook treatment.
26 Most econometrics packages that explicitly estimate the linear fixed effects model 
partition out the cross-sectional fixed effects, often with the option of having them 
recovered. The main reason for partitioning out the fixed effects is the size of the (X'X) 
matrix when the number of individuals becomes at all large. With our modest sample size, 
we preferred to create our own firm dummies and use standard OLS routines. This has the 
advantage of giving us access to the full range of residual diagnostics available for the 
standard case, including leverage plots. Creating the fixed effects manually has the 
disadvantage (advantage?) that one needs to carefully adjust the list of dummies for the 
various group regressions. We hope that standard software will soon provide the full range 





































































































gross investment of company i at time t; measured as the 
change in the gross value of depreciable assets (plant 
and equipment).
last period's gross value of assets.
net earnings available for distribution (NEAD) plus 
nominal allowances (mostly depreciation), subsequently 
labelled as "cash".
stock of short term securities; measures the amount of 
liquid assets available for quick sales at the beginning of 
the period (cash plus short term financial securities.) 
the market value of common equity stock divided by its 
book value. Thus, our definition of Q does not follow the 
standard interpretation in the literature which is the 
market value of the firm relative to its replacement cost. 
Because of insufficient data on the market value of debt 
we could only approximate "Tobin's Q" with what we 
should be calling strictly speaking "Common Equity Q". 
Scaled to conform with the scale of the other variables, 
intercept
(N-l) firm specific fixed effects 
(T-l) year dummies





























































































All regression results are summarised in Tables 3.A and 3.B as well as in 
Figures 5.A,B and C. The Tables and the Figures report the regression results 
by degree of affiliation. The total number of records in the data set was 203, 
seven years and 29 companies. Several records were lost; 29 due to first 
differencing and another 35 due to missing values in at least one of the 
variables27. This leaves 139 records for analysis. After performing detailed 
residual analysis we excluded the Oberschlesische Kokswerke with company 
ID 29. Using leverage plots (see Appendix) we decided to exclude 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke for the following reasons: (1) It is a company with 
more leverage than any other company in our (small) sample and totally 
dominates the results. (2) The full name Oberschlesische Kokswerke and 
Chemische Fabriken (Upper Silesian Cokeries and Chemical Plants) suggests 
that it is quite different from the companies in the rest of our sample and that it 
might be misclassified. At any rate, inclusion of Oberschlesische Kokswerke 
does not really alter our results. For the cash flow (liquidity) coefficient, 
including Oberschlesische Kokswerke suggests that cash flow matters for 
affiliated companies, but less so the closer one moves to the "core" affiliation 
regime 4 and less than for the non-affiliated companies. Our main findings for 
non-affiliated companies, that the flow measure of liquidity matters is 
unaffected since the Oberschlesische Kokswerke do not enter the non- 
affiliated sample in classifications 1,2 and 3. Hence, our main results use 133 
records. Tables 3.A and 3.B include the results without exclusion of the 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke Figures 5.A, 5.B and 5.C do not.
Figure 5.A plots the regression coefficients for cash flow, short term securities 
and "Q" against the four affiliation criteria. The dark markers represent the 
affiliated sample, the white markers the non-affiliated sample. The lower part 
of the chart shows the change in the number of records in each class across 
regimes and the Aufsichtsrat group in each class. From left to right, the 
affiliated sample goes from the widest possible "affiliation" criterion to the 
"core" of companies with direct Grofibanken presence in a company's 
Aufsichtsrat . The non-affiliated sample moves from free of any banker 
presence to the presence of anybody but an Aufsichtsrat from one of the 
Grofibanken directly. Moving from left to right, the affiliated sample shrinks 
from 96, 56 and 38 to 29 records, the non-affiliated sample grows from 37, 77
27We assume observations are missing at random (as opposed to missing completely at 




























































































and 95 to 104 records. For the affiliated sample, short term assets have a 
positive influence on investment, that rises when the companies with an 
Aufsichtsrat sent by private banks are excluded, but falls as one moves to the 
"core" of closely affiliated Grofibanken companies. In contrast, the effect of 
cash flow moves from having a small positive influence on investment to no 
effect and becomes negative for the samples that contain the "most affiliated" 
companies, at least according to the Grofibanken criterion. Figures 5.B and 5.C 
provide a picture of the standard errors on the coefficients of the affiliated 
regression and the non-affiliated regressions respectively. Even with the large 
standard errors on Q and the cash flow coefficients for the affiliated samples, 
we feel that these regressions, for this industry, time period and sample, 
provide evidence that liquidity matters for Grofibanken affiliated firms. In 
contrast, firms that are very close to the “core” of Grofibanken influence and 
knowledge can invest in bad times. For the non-affiliated companies, no matter 




























































































Table 3.A: Regression Results for Affiliated Samples
(Oberschlesische Kokswerke with ID 29; reference in last column)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Cash 0.1620 41.0048 - 1.4046 - 1.5160 0.2966 0.2254 0.1075
Flow/Ass
0.2920 0.4801 0.6208 0.7525 0.1864 0.2408 0.2963
ST Ass/Ass 0.4666 1.8453 1.3200 0.8488 - 0.0879 - 0.1253 - 0.1099
0.2811 0.6997 0.7539 0.9698 0.1316 0.1780 0.2356
Tobin's 0.2171 0.2127 0.4695 1.2586 0.2146 03537 03607
Q/100
0.1117 0.2116 0.3924 0.6913 0.1144 0.1868 0.4706
Rank D. Mat. 26 19 16 14 27 20 17
Deg. Freed. 70 37 22 15 75 42 27
No. records 96 56 38 29 102 62 44
SSR 2.8052 1.7584 1.0025 0.8202 3.4494 2.7643 2.2451
Var. Res. 0.0401 0.0475 0.0456 0.0547 0.0460 0.0658 0.0832
Sq. mult. 0.3529 0.4827 0.5553 0.6208 0.3323 0.3451 0.2634
corr.
F-statistic 1.5271 1.9177 1.8317 1.8891 1.4359 1.1650 0.6035
Lev. of sign. 0.9146 0.9537 0.9041 0.8806 0.8851 0.6701 0.1465
The first four columns show the regression results for the four classification 
criteria excluding the Oberschlesischen Kokswerke. This firm swaps affiliation 
between Class 3 and 4. Hence, inclusion adds three extra column to this table. 
The F-Statistic comes from a test of the full firm and year effects model against 
a model with just the intercept.
Table 3.B: Regression Results for Non-Affiliated Samples
(Oberschlesische Kokswerke with ID 29; reference in last column)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 4
Cash Flow/Ass 1.0478 0.8905 1.0478 1.0490 0.5953
0.4379 0.2500 0.2152 0.2078 0.1394
ST Ass/Ass 0.2275 0.0412 0.0014 0.0117 - 0.1604
0.2199 0.1523 0.1439 0.1389 0.0900
Tobin's Q/100 0.0406 0.0514 0.0389 0.0400 0.0607
0.0515 0.0393 0.0387 0.0375 0.0418
Rank D. Mat. 15 55 25 27 28
Deg. Freed. 22 22 70 77 82
No. records 37 77 95 104 110
SSR 0.5006 1.0649 1.3975 1.4710 2.1136
Var. Res. 0.0228 0.0194 0.0200 0.0191 0.0258
Sq. mult. corr. 0.6320 0.5403 0.5947 0.5867 0.5214
F-statistic ' 2.6983 30.0787 4.2796 4.2033 3.3090
Lev. of sign. 0.9819 0.9996 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
The first four columns show the regression results for the four 
classification criteria excluding the Oberschlesischen Kokswerke. 
This firm swaps affiliation between Class 3 and 4. Hence, 
inclusion adds one extra column to this table. The F-Statistic 
comes from a test of the full firm and year effects model against a 




























































































Figure 5.A : Sensitivity o f  Regression Coefficients on  C lassification C riterion
(sam p le  e x c lud es  O be rsch le s is ch e  K oksw erke ; 133 re co rd s  w ere  u sed  in  to ta l)
CD




































Affiliated: •  Cash/A(t-1 ) ■  S.T. Assets/A(t-1 ) ♦  Q /100
Non-Affiliated: O Cash/A(t-1 ) □  S.T. Assets/A(t-1 ) © Q /100
The F ig u re  p lo ts  the re g re s s io n  co e ff ic ie n ts  a g a in s t  the d eg ree  o f  G ro f ib a n k e n  a ff i l ia t io n .  
A f f i l ia t io n  is  d e f in e d  a c c o rd in g  to the A u fs ich ts ra t  c r ite r io n ;  th is  is  g iv e n  in  the bo ttom  box. 
/I s  a  ru le , b la c k  m eans a ff i lia te d , w h ite  m eans n o n -a ff ilia te d . The b a r  c h a r t  in  the  m id d le  




























































































Figure 5.B: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Affiliated Samples
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Affiliated: •C a sh /A (t-1 ) ■  S.T. Assets/A(t-1 ) * 0 / 1 0 0
The F ig u re  p lo ts  the reg re s s io n  co e ff ic ie n ts  a g a in s t  the deg ree  o f  G ro f ib a n k e n  a ff i lia t io n .  
A f f i l ia t io n  is  d e f in e d  a c c o rd in g  to the A u fs ich ts ra t c r ite r io n ;  th is  is  g iv e n  in  the bottom  box. 
A s  a  ru le , b la c k  m eans a ff ilia te d , w h ite  m eans n on -a ff ilia te d . The b a r  c h a r t  in  the m id d le  




























































































Figure 5.G Regression Coefficients and Std. Errors. Non-Afffliated Sam ples





















































Non-Affiliated: O Cash/A(t-1 ) □  S.T. Assets/A(t-1 ) O Q /100
The F ig u r e  p lo ts  the re g re s s io n  co e ff ic ie n ts  a g a in s t  the d eg ree  o f  G r o f  banker! a f f i l ia t io n .  
A f f i l ia t io n  is  d e f in e d  a c c o rd in g  to the A u fs ic h ts ra t  c r ite r io n ;  th is  is  g iv e n  in  the bo ttom  box. 
A s  a  ru le , b la c k  m eans a ff i lia te d , w h ite  m eans n on -a fftlia ted . The b a r  c h a r t  in  the  m id d le  




























































































VI. Interpretation of the Results
Previous explanations of the importance of cash flow for non affiliated 
companies from Japan and the United States are applicable to the German case 
as well. One interpretation brought forward by Hubbard, Fazzari, and Petersen 
(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) and Schaller 
(forthcoming) among many others, is the imperfect capital markets view: 
Because of asymmetric information non-affiliated companies face much higher 
costs of external financing than do affiliated ones. Thus, a company that is 
affiliated to one of the Grofibanken uses external funds to finance its 
investment expenditures because it could get relatively cheaper access to 
external capital markets through its banking connection. Indeed, in a young 
corporate bond market reputation effects will be very important, especially 
after a wave of bankruptcies like the one Germany experienced in the early 
1870s'.
We believe that the models of Douglas Diamond (1984, 1991) are applicable to 
German corporate finance before WW-P*. To finance investment and 
expansion, a company in Imperial Germany did have a genuine choice between 
going to the stock market, to issue equity or debt, or to a bank. Indeed, stock 
market regulations did not even require any kind of intermediary. Why did 
companies decide to finance investment through banks, and particularly "Great 
Banks" (with great power) instead of staying independent by going to the 
market directly. In Diamond's models, investors lend to firms who have built a 
reputation. Banks monitor firms directly and can act as substitutes for 
reputation, especially for young firms.
We found two kinds of reasons why Diamonds’ models might fit. One, 
corporations during the period considered in this paper were young. Figure 6., 
taken from Becht and De Long (1993), shows a histogram of the years when 
632 corporations traded on the Berlin Stock Exchange in 1913 were first 
traded. Together, these companies represent more than 97% of all par values on 
the Exchange that year. As the superimposed Box plot indicates, the median of 
the sample lies in 1898.
28We did not endorse Diamond's models immediately and without reservations. After all, 
why should models developed with securitisation and the United States in the late 20th 




























































































Figure 6.: Age Profile of Corporations traded on Berlin Exchange 1913
I---- 1------h------------1 0 I l-^-H
Source: Becht and De Long (1993)
Two, the industrial bond market was thin and the only paper traded were bonds 
issued by a Grofibank on behalf of a corporation. In addition to the GroBbanks 
stamp of approval, these bonds were often secured by a mortgage, despite the 
fact that under German bankruptcy laws investors holding bonds were served 
before everybody else. In his authoritative handbook, Obst (1913) writes: “The 
bond (Schuldverschreibung) of industrial firms has developed because some 
firms obtained very large bank loans. These were so large that the banks, in 
order to avoid tying up large proportions of their assets, divided these loans 
into smaller pieces and resold them.” [Obst (1913), page 562].
VII. Conclusion
We concentrate this study of corporate finance in Imperial Germany on the 
mining industry because of its historical importance in the understanding of the 
economic development of Germany. It was shown that from 1870 to 1913, the 
German mining industry grew from very modest levels, to overtake the British 
Empire and take second place behind the United States at the eve of WWI. 
Gershenkron (1962) emphasised the institutional aspects of the German capital 
markets in understanding this rapid economic development. This paper has 
tried to provide some evidence suggesting that the Imperial Germany's 




























































































alleviating the impact of capital market imperfections. We have tried to do so 
by showing that mining and steel companies affiliated with one of Imperial 
Germany's "Great Banks" were not liquidity constrained. Although one can 
never be sure about what would have been without the Grofibanken, at least 
one is tempted to speculate whether the rapid growth of German steel had to do 
with the way large corporations in both countries were controlled and financed. 
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This Appendix describes the data collection effort and the transformation of the original 
balance sheets as found in S a lin g 's  B o rsen pap ie re  into a common "stencil" balance sheet that 
provides a certain degree of aggregation and comparability. It aims to make our procedure as 
transparent as possible. It is hoped that after reading this Appendix, anybody who has access 
to S a l in g 's  should be able to reproduce or extend our results. In this spirit the data we 
collected are available upon request.
1905 Balance Sheet o f  Consolidierte A lkali-W erke





Al Bergbau- Konzession 
(mining rights)
3600000 PI Aktienkapital














1867719 P4 Reserve Fond 
(reserve fund)
1389148
A5 Maschinen u. Dampfkessel 
(machines and steam containers)
908316 P5 Dispositions Fond 
(??? fund)
5000
A6 Utensilien und Gerate
(msc. equipment and instruments)










26265 P8 Pensions Fond 
(pension fund)
633216
A9 Effluvien Konto 
(??? account)





1 PIO Kreditoren 
(accounts payable)
761832
A ll Pferde und Wagen 
(horses and cars)
1 PII Dividende 
(Dividends payable)
1440000
A12 vorausbez. Versicherungen 
(paid in advance insurance)




(Surety or safe pledge securities)
495372 P13 Genusscheine 
(Good profit bill ?)
311
A14 {Cautions Wechsel 
(proceeds from guarantees)




(bands and other paper assets)
1831782 P15 Direktoren Tantieme und Beamten 
Gratifikation








(stocks in other companies)

















zusam m en 18901842 18901842




























































































Sources and Uses of Income Account of Consolidierte Alkali-Werke
S to ck  E x ch a n ge  N am e: W esteregeln  A lk a li-W e rk e )



















G7 zu sa m m en  
(T o ta l S o u rc es  )
3 4 29089
Uses of Income






G10 b le ib t R eingew inn  
(N e t E a rn in g s ava ila b le  f o r  
d istr ib u tio n , N E A D )
1976603
































































































1 Cash Cash A18, A19
2 STSec Short Term Securities A15
3 AcctRec Accounts Receivable A20
4 Invento Inventories A21
5 DepAs Depreciable Assets A1-A11
s Tot As Total Assets
7 ParValue Par Value of Common Stock PI
8 Vorz.-
Aktien
Par Value of Pref. Stock P2
9 BDebt Bank Debt *
10 Bonds Bonds *
11 Mortgage Mortgages *
12 OthDebt Other Debt P6.P10
13 Reserve Reserves P3,P4
14 RetErn Retained Earnings PI 8
15 Dividend Dividends PI 1
16 Grat To Management PI 5
17 AR To Aufsichtsrat PI 6
19 Gewinn Net Earnings before distribution G7
20 Deprecia Depreciation G9
21 Reingewinn Net Earnings available for Distribution G10
22 Sales **
18 Price Share Price **
23 DivRate Dividend Rate
24 A sse ts Assets before Depreciation see bottom
25 M arktV a l Market Value 7 x 1 8
26 BookVal Book Value 7 + 1 4
27 TobinsQ Equity Q 25/26
28 STAssets Short Term Assets 1 + 2
29 L iq u id ity Liguidity 21+20-A3
30 Inves t Investment A24
* : item not in example
**: not taken from balance sheet (if available)
t






























































































Since we collected the data set ourselves we had to decide how to code missing 
values. After some reflection, we decided to be "tough" and code all variables 
that had no numerical information in the balance sheet as missing. For 
example, consider the case of the inventory variable. In five out of the seven 
years a company reports positive inventories in a range between M400,000 and 
M2,000,000, in the remaining two years the balance sheets contain no separate 
information on inventories. Should one assume that there were no inventories 
that year and enter a zero, or declare the data point missing? We decided to 
declare all such points as missing. The only exception are debt variables. If a 
company did not report any bank debt or mortgages, we entered a zero. Hence, 






























































































This Appendix shows leverage plots corresponding to the regression results 
reported in the text and an analysis of the effects of excluding the 
Oberschlesische Kokswerke.
Initially, we fitted regressions including all companies and were puzzled to find 
the results that are reported in columns 5,6 and 7 of Table 3.A and column 5 of 
Table 3.B. Exploratory data analysis, had alerted us to the possible presence of 
important outliers (or, depending how one looks at this, very influential 
observations). Proceeding to diagnostics, we looked at leverage plots. The 
leverage plots used here come from JMP®, a program that implements the 
work of Sail (1990), who has provided formulas for drawing leverage plots 
when imposing general linear hypotheses on the coefficients of a regression. In 
the case where one imposes a zero restriction on one coefficient at a time, these 
are identical to the more limited partial-regression residual leverage plots of 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) implemented, for example, in SPSS™. 
Leverage plots or partial regression plots use residuals that are computed as the 
difference between the observed dependent variable and the predicted 
dependent variable when the ith independent variable is excluded and the 
residuals from the ith independent variable when it is compared to the predicted 
value from the regression leaving out the ith independent variable.
The horizontal line in the Figures is the mean of the values on the vertical axis. 
The vertical distance between any point this mean line corresponds to the 
residual from the restricted regression. For the confidence intervals, it turns out 
that when the slope parameter (the regression coefficient) is significantly 
different from zero, both confidence lines will cross the horizontal line. When 
the horizontal line is the asymptote, the test the null hypothesis of zero 
influence is inconclusive, when the confidence lines do not cross at all, it is 
rejected. Points far out on the horizontal axis will be the ones with a lot of 
leverage-, they have a strong influence on the slope of the regression 
coefficients. Again, see Sail (1990), Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) and the 
JMP® User's Manual, especially Appendix A, for details.
Inspection of the leverage plots in the first column of Figures IELA and EI.B 
reveals that the Oberschlesische Kokswerke (and Chemische Fabriken) has 




























































































term securities coefficient. Excluding Oberschlesische Kokswerke drives the 
regression coefficient for liquidity (class 2, affiliated) from 0.2254 to -0.0048 
and for short term assets from -1.253 to 1.8453. An inspection of the leverage 
plots reveals why. The combination of influential points on the right and to the 
left of the centre of the scatter twists the regression line around and, in both 
cases, changes the sign of the regression coefficient The estimates of the 
coefficient on Q are hardly affected since the observations on Oberschlesische 
Kokswerke hardly have any leverage. The plots also reveal other interesting 
facts. The main suspect from exploratory, bivariate scatters (not reported) was 
Eisenwerk Kraft 1911. In the leverage plot, it turns out that this point is an 
outlier, in the sense that it produces a large residual, but that it does not have 
much leverage. Indeed, the coefficient on short term securities in the 
classification 2 and 3 equation excluding Oberschlesische Kokswerke (III. A, 
m.B, column 2, middle) is hardly affected by the exclusion of Eisenwerk Kraft 
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